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Ernest E Figart, Jr. *
Thomas A. Graves, * * and Storrow Moss Gordon***
The major developments in the field of civil procedure during the survey
period are found in judicial decisions and statutory enactments. This Arti-
cle examines these developments and considers their impact on existing
Texas procedure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
The impact on subject matter jurisdiction of an increase in the alleged
amount in controversy was considered in Cantu v. J Weingarten's, Inc.,
As originally filed, plaintiff's petition alleged an amount of damages that
was within the county court at law's jurisdictional limit. By subsequent
amendment plaintiff petitioned for additional damages accruing through
the passage of time, thereby raising the claimed recovery to an amount in
excess of the court's jurisdictional limit. Upon a plea to the jurisdiction,
the trial court dismissed the suit as exceeding its statutory jurisdictional
limit of $5000.2 Following the lead of an earlier case,3 the court of civil
appeals reversed, reiterating that "[a] trial court may enter judgment in
excess of its jurisdictional limit where the original amount of damages
sought is within the jurisdictional limit of the court and the plaintiff, by
subsequent amendment, seeks only additional damages that are accruing
because of the passage of time."'4 Furthermore, according to the court,
"[imn the absence of pleading and proof that the allegations in a plaintiffs
original petition have been made fraudulently or in bad faith, the fact that
the plaintiffs amended petition alleges damages in excess of the court's
jurisdictional limit does not necessarily deprive the court of its jurisdiction
over the case." 5
• B.S., Texas A&M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern Method-
ist University, Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
•* B.B.A., New Mexico State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attor-
ney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law,
Dallas, Texas.
1. 616 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970a (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1965-1981).
3. Flynt v. Garcia, 587 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1979) (per curiam); see Haginas v. Malbis
Memorial Foundation, 163 Tex, 274, 354 S.W.2d 368 (1962); Isbell v. Kenyon-Warner
Dredging Co., 113 Tex. 528, 261 S.W. 762 (1924).
4. 616 S.W.2d at 291.
5. Id.
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II. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The propriety of out-of-state service under article 2031b,6 the Texas
long-arm statute, continues to be the subject of considerable attention.
Section 3 of article 2031b provides that when a nonresident "engages in
business in this State," service on the nonresident is authorized under the
statute "in any action, suit or proceedings arising out of such business."
7
The case of Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc.8 is significant because it indicates
that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit follows a
stricter construction of the statute than do the Texas state courts. The
question presented was whether the plaintiffs could rely upon activities of
the defendants in Texas that were not related to the cause of action as-
serted to establish personal jurisdiction under article 203 1b. Undaunted
by several state court decisions directly on point,9 and apparently oblivious
to Erie,10 the Fifth Circuit held that article 203 1b does not reach as far as
the federal constitution will permit and that it expressly limits its applica-
tion to causes of action arising out of activities done within the state."
The holding in Preean could prove to have only modest procedural im-
pact because a plaintiff has the option of relying upon rule 108 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure' 2 for a full constitutional reach in effecting
service upon a nonresident,' 3 regardless of whether suit is brought in state
6. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
7. Id. § 3 (Vernon 1964).
8. 625 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981).
9. See, e.g., U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (art. 203 1b extends as far as federal constitutional requirements
of due process will allow); Michigan Gen. Corp. v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, Inc., 582 S.W.2d
594, 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (art. 2031b is restricted only by
fourteenth amendment to United States Constitution); N.K. Parrish, Inc. v. Schrimscher,
516 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ) (art. 203 lb represents an effort
to establish in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents to extent permitted by federal consti-
tutional requirements of due process). See also Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495
F.2d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 1974) (art. 203 lb allows Texas to reach as far as federal constitutional
requirements of due process permit in exercising in personam jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir. 1973) (art.
203 lb represents effort by Texas to exploit in personam jurisdiction to its limits.); Lone Star
Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1961) (purpose of art.
203 lb is to exploit fullest possible reach of statute under federal constitution); Clark Adver-
tising Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 331 F. Supp. 1058, 1059 (N.D. Tex. 1971), af'd, 490 F.2d 834 (5th
Cir. 1974) (art. 203 lb should be given its broadest construction, subject only to basic consti-
tutional requirements); Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction,- Article 2031b, the Texas "Long-
Arm" Jurisdiction Statute, and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Else-
where, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 279, 307 (1964).
10. Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536,
540-41 (5th Cir. 1964).
11. 652 F.2d at 1265. Moreover, in Prejean the Fifth Circuit accorded no deference to
the interpretation of art. 2031b by the district court, although "[a] federal district court
judge's determination of the law in his state is, as a rule, entitled to great weight on review."
Avery v. Maremont Corp., 628 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1980).
12. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108 was amended in 1976 to authorize service on a nonresident or
absent defendant "to the full extent that he may be required to appear and answer under the
Constitution of the United States in an action either m rem or in personam."
13. Regarding the scope of amended TEX. R. Civ. P. 108, the Texas Supreme Court in
U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 n.l (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1063 (1978), noted that "the purposes of the amendment [to rule 108] is to permit
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or federal court. 14
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA. v. Hall'5 could lead to a de-
termination by the Texas Supreme Court of the outer reach of the Texas
long-arm statute. The plaintiffs, survivors of four individuals who were
killed in the crash of a helicopter in Peru, sued a South American corpora-
tion in a wrongful death action and effected service under article 2031b.
Neither the individuals killed in the crash nor their representatives were
residents of or had any contacts with Texas. A joint venture that had em-
ployed the persons killed was engaged in the construction of a pipeline in
Peru and, in connection with the project, had contracted with the defend-
ant to furnish helicopter transportation service in that country. The evi-
dence was disputed as to whether the contract was negotiated in Texas,
Oklahoma or Peru; however, it was apparently uncontroverted that the
defendant accepted and executed the contract in Peru. Further, the con-
tract provided that the parties to it "were to be subject to the forum and
laws of Peru." 16 While monies due the defendant under the contract
originated from a Texas bank, they were sent to the defendant in either
New York or Panama. Apart from these events, the defendant had no
contacts with Texas. The defendant responded to the suit by filing a spe-
cial appearance and, after a hearing on the matter, the trial court dismissed
the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. In an appeal by the plaintiffs,
the court of civil appeals, relying upon a federal case 17 that considered a
similar situation, held that the contacts of the defendant were insufficient
to satisfy the requirements of article 203 lb.18
Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A. ,19 a case of first impression in
Texas, may provide some encouragement to recalcitrant defendants in-
volved in jurisdictional contests in a federal forum. The plaintiffs brought
suit against two nonresident corporations, seeking recovery for damages
arising from the sinking of a foreign vessel. Service was effected under
article 203 1b, and the defendants responded with a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction. Subsequently, in an attempt to establish the
acquisition of in personam jurisdiction to the constitutional limits." See W. DORSANEO,
TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 32.50[2], at 32-18 (1981); Sampson, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Mar-
ries the Texas Family Code, 38 TEX. B.J. 1023, 1033 n.20 (175). But see Letter from Hans W.
Baade to the Texas Bar Journal (Dec. 1975), reprinted in 38 TEX. B.J. 988 (1975).
14. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e) (authorizing service in federal court on nonresidents in
same manner prescribed in statute or rule of court of the state in which the federal court is
held). See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 1112-1113 (1969).
15. 616 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, no writ).
16. d. at 252.
17. See Reich v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 409 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Tex. 1974), affd without
opinion, 530 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1976) (suit for wrongful death arising from a helicopter crash
off the coast of Ghana where service was attempted under article 203 1b).
18. 616 S.W.2d at 252. In the course of the printing of this article, the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the court of civil appeals and, in doing so, provided signifi-
cant guidelines to the interpretation of art. 2031 b. Hall v. Helicopterios nacionales de Co-
lombia, S.A., 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 190 (Feb. 27, 1982). This development will be reviewed in
the 1983 Survey.
19. 629 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2345 (1981).
1982l
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defendants' contacts with the forum, the plaintiffs propounded interrogato-
ries on the defendants. The defendants evaded the discovery and, after a
hearing on the matter, the court ordered them to respond fully within a
specified period. After the defendants failed to comply with the order, the
trial court entered a default judgment against them for their contumacious
conduct. On an appeal from the default judgment, the Fifth Circuit reiter-
ated that in the federal courts " [tlhe burden is on the plaintiff to establish
jurisdiction when challenged by the defendant," 20 but noted that "[i]n this
case, the plaintiffs were foreclosed from presenting jurisdictional evidence
in the exclusive possession of the defendants because the defendants re-
fused to disclose the information in response to discovery procedures."'
z
Nevertheless, in finding that due process required the necessary facts to be
of record, the court held that the plaintiffs were not exempt from the bur-
den of proof even though they had been unable to obtain information from
the defendants. 22 Although it set aside the default judgment, the court
remanded the case back to the trial court and directed that the plaintiffs be
given further opportunity to develop the necessary facts from other
sources.
23
Two final cases in the area of personal jurisdiction should be of interest
to the trial attorney. Marathon Metallic Building Co. v. Mountain Empire
Construction Co.24 involved a suit against a nonresident on his written
guaranty. The guaranty covered extensions of credit under a contract be-
tween the plaintiff and a nonresident corporation that provided for the
purchase of merchandise to be manufactured in Texas. Although the
guaranty was silent as to its place of performance, the document had been
sent to the plaintiff in Houston, Texas, and stipulated that it was to be
governed by the laws of Texas. With the exception of the foregoing, the
defendant had no other contacts with Texas. Nevertheless, the court found
the guaranty to be a "purposeful and affirmative action, resulting in, at the
least, a minimum contact with Texas,"'25 and held that due process was
satisfied, and therefore sustained service on the defendant under article
2031b.26 The decision in La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc. v. Schmelig Construc-
20. 629 F.2d at 1138; see, e.g., Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 490
(5th Cir. 1974); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1973). But
see Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Taylor v. American Emery Wheel Works, 480 S.W.2d 26, 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1972, no writ); Roquemore v. Roquemore, 431 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1968, no writ).
21. 629 F.2d at 1138.
22. Id.; see Aetna Business Credit, Inc. v. Universal Decor & Interior Design, Inc., 635
F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1981). Contra Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N.
America, 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Calendonia, 443 F.2d 10 (4th Cir.
1971).
23. 629 F.2d at 1140.
24. 653 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1981).
25. Id. at 923.
26. Id.; accord, Gubitosi v. Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc., 545 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, no writ); National Truckers Serv., Inc. v. Aero Syss., Inc., 480 S.W.2d 455
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lion CO 27 also turned upon the focus of a written guaranty executed by a
nonresident defendant. The only contact the nonresident defendant had
with Texas was its transmission through the mails of a guaranty under
which it guaranteed the obligations of a subsidiary to build motels in a
number of states, including Texas. Upholding service on the defendant
under article 2031b, the court concluded that the defendant's contacts,
though minimal, satisfied the statute and comported with due process. 28
III. SERVICE OF PROCESS
A number of decisions during the survey period invalidated service on
the basis of inadvertent errors made by officials involved in the service of
process. In Texas Inspection Services, Inc. v. Melville29 the plaintiff sought
to effect service under article 2.11 of the Texas Business Corporation Act.30
Article 2.11 provides that if a corporation's registered agent cannot be lo-
cated for service of process then the secretary of state may be served in-
stead, and he shall cause a copy of the process to be forwarded by
registered mail, "addressed to the corporation at its registered office."' 31 In
Melville, however, the secretary of state sent a copy of the process to the
defendant at 2525 Marilee Lane rather than 2526 Marilee Lane, which was
the defendant's registered office. Finding this attempt at service to be in-
sufficient, the court held that since the copy was inadvertently sent to an
address that was not that of the defendant's registered office, the secretary
of state had not performed the duty imposed on him by the statute. 32
A similar error occurred with respect to the return of the sheriff in Zara-
goza v. De La Paz Morales.33 Although the named defendant was Andrew
J. Zaragoza, the sheriffs return stated that service had been effected on
Andrew L. Zaragoza. Pointing to the discrepancy in the middle initial, the
defendant sought to set aside the default judgment. The appellate court
concluded that the service of citation on the defendant was inadequate to
support a default judgment and therefore reversed the trial court.34 The
final example of harm caused by an official's inadvertent error is Pete
Singh Produce, Inc. v. Macias.35 Macias is a warning that the requirements
of rule 101,36 which states that the citation "shall be directed to the defend-
ant," must be strictly followed. The clerk's citation had been addressed to
the individual serving as the registered agent for the defendant corpora-
tion, rather than the corporation itself. On appeal from a default judg-
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McKanna v. Edgar, 380 S.W.2d 889
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965).
27. 617 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
28. Yd. at 828.
29. 616 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
30. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.11 (Vernon 1980).
31. Id.
32. 616 S.W.2d at 254.
33. 616 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
34. Id. at 296; see Hendon v. Pugh, 46 Tex. 211 (1876).
35. 608 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ).
36. TEX. R. Civ. P. 101.
1982]
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ment, the court held that the citation was violative of the statutory citation
requirements, and insufficient to support a default judgment. 37
IV. VENUE
In the area of venue the provisions of section 17.56 of the Deceptive
Trade Practices--Consumer Protection Act (DTPA)38 were once again a
major source of judicial decisions during the survey period. Under the
1977 version of the DTPA, suit against a defendant was permissible in a
county where he had "done business."' 39 Although the legislature has since
deleted that provision,40 a number of courts during the survey period were
required to construe the "doing business" provision in suits governed by
the former venue section.4' In keeping with prior broad readings of the
provision,42 the court in T P. Walsh Co. v. Manning held that a defendant
had done business in Henderson County within the meaning of the statute
by making trips to Henderson County during the negotiation and perform-
ance of the contract sued upon in order to examine records, work out
problems, and deliver the final product.43
In Big Rock Properties Texas, Inc. v. King" the court carried the broad
construction of the doing business provision even further in a suit involv-
ing the lease of space in a shopping mall. The court found the telephone
directory listing of the shopping mall in the county of suit to be sufficient
proof that the defendant solicited business in that county.4 5 In contrast,
the court in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Altreche held that an advertisement
placed in a telephone directory did not constitute the necessary venue
proof when the directory was printed after the date of suit.46 Reading sec-
tion 17.56 carefully, the court held that the statutory requirement that the
defendant "has done business" is not satisfied by proof that he is currently
doing business.47
The doing business element of proof was also lacking in Herfort v. Har-
grove.48 In that case the court held that mailing receipts to purchasers of
37. 608 S.W.2d at 823.
38. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.56 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
39. 1977 Tex. Gen Laws, ch. 216, § 8, at 604. See also Figari, Texas Civil Procedure,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 415, 420 (1980).
40. 1979 Tex. Gen. Law, ch. 603, § 7, at 1332. See Figari, supra note 39, at 421.
41. The DTPA specifically provides that its provisions are prospective only and do not
apply to causes arising prior to its effective date. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.6
(Vernon Supp. 1982).
42. See, e.g., Walsh Co. v. Manning, 609 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980,
no writ); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ), discussed in Figari, supra note 39, at 421.
43. 609 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
44. 613 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
45. Id. at 805; accord, Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186, 191
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ) (listing of insurance agencies as agent
for defendant in Houston yellow pages telephone directory constituted "doing business"
under section 17.56).
46. 605 S.W.2d 733, 734-35 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
47. Id. at 734.
48. 606 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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goods in the county of suit was not doing business, but merely confirma-
tory evidence of business concluded elsewhere. 49 Similarly, in Ferrara v.
Corinth Joint Venture the mere fact that the goods in question were located
in the county of suit was held not to be sufficient evidence that the defend-
ant had done business in that county.50
The decision in Munoz v. Farmland Industries, Inc.51 made clear that the
requirement of rule 86,52 that the grounds relied upon to confer venue be
set out specifically in the controverting plea, is applicable when section
17.56 of the DTPA is involved.5 3 Compliance with pleading requirements
was also considered in Portland Savings & Loan Association v. Bevill, Bres-
ler & Schulman Government Securities, Inc.5 4 The court held that a plain-
tiff seeking to rely on section 17.56 to maintain venue was required to
allege facts showing that it was a "consumer" of "goods" or "services. ' 55
Portland Savings also recognized that section 17.56 is expressed in permis-
sive rather than mandatory terms, and therefore may not be used by a
nonresident defendant to transfer venue.5 6
Two courts during the survey period considered the appropriate venue
of a cross-action for indemnity brought by a defendant in a DTPA suit
against a third party. 7 Opposite results were reached by the two courts
when they determined whether venue was properly maintainable in the
county of the plaintiffs original suit. In Diamond Shamrock Corp. v.
Chem-Tex Farm Supply the court concluded that the character of the
cross-action for indemnity was distinct from the main suit and did not in-
corporate the elements of the primary DTPA suit so as to make section
17.56 applicable. 58 The court in Williamson v. J V Frank Construction,
Inc.,59 in contrast, found that by enacting the provision permitting indem-
nity suits, the legislature intended to change former holdings60 so as to
49. Id. at 360. The court concluded that a slogan on the receipt stating "Factory Prices
on Diamonds" was simply a "reminder" that the defendant was still doing business else-
where. Id.
50. 611 S.W.2d 669, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, no writ).
51. 603 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ dism'd).
52. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86.
53. 603 S.W.2d at 229.
54. 619 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
55. Id. at 245. The terms "consumer," "goods," and "services" are expressly defined in
§ 17.45 of the Act. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1982).
The necessary venue fact to be proved in Portland Savings was that the solicitation upon
which the action was based took place in the county of suit. 619 S.W.2d at 245.
56. 619 S.W.2d at 246.
57. Prior to 1977 courts had held that no cause of action for indemnity in a deceptive
trade practice suit existed. See, e.g., Jones v. Tucker, 611 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1980, no writ); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Licht, 544 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ.
App.-E1 Paso 1976, no writ). Section 17.55A was added to the act during the 1977 amend-
ments to provide for such a cause of action. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.55A
(Vernon Supp. 1982).
58. 618 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
59. 616 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
60. See, e.g., Jones v. Tucker, 611 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no




permit venue in the county of the original action.61
Subdivision 5(a) of article 199562 was also the subject of considerable
judicial scrutiny during the survey period. In Garcia v. Discrobis Oil Co.63
the court examined a lease term requiring the lessee to pay "at the county
of [lessor's] residence" 64 for damage to the property. Holding that this
provision permitted the "possibility" of payment in more than one county,
the court concluded that, within the meaning of subdivision 5(a), the con-
tract was not performable in "a particular county. '65 On the other hand,
the court in Associates Development Corp. v. WF & JF Barnes, Inc.
found subdivision 5(a) to have been satisfied by invoices that stated that
they would be payable in the county of suit at the seller's option, despite
the optional nature of the place of performance. 66
In Williams v. Goodpasture, Inc.67 suit was brought against a corporation
and its president to recover on a promissory note executed by the presi-
dent. The president sought to avoid the application of subdivision 5(a) by
arguing that the plaintiff was required to show a binding obligation against
him on the note as a venue prerequisite. 68 Rejecting this argument, the
court emphasized that the venue fact to be proved was whether the person
"alleged to be liable" contracted in writing to perform the obligation.69
Thus, the defendant's affirmative defense of lack of individual capacity
could only be raised at the trial on the merits. 70
Dave Summers Realtors, Inc. v. Astro Leasing, Inc.71 raised the question
of whether a subsequent oral waiver of a written place of payment term
could render subdivision 5(a) inapplicable. Because the written contract
required all waivers to be in writing,72 the court held that the plaintiff's
oral direction to send payments to a county other than that named in the
contract would not alter the venue rights conferred by subdivision 5(a).73
61. 616 S.W.2d at 439.
62. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982) allows venue in an
action based on a contract to be maintained in a county if that particular county is named as
a place of performance in a written contract.
63. 612 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
64. Id. at 265.
65. Id. at 266. See also Sabine Prod. Co. v. Frost Nat'l Bank, 596 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ dism'd).
66. 614 S.W.2d 876, 881 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ dism'd).
67. 607 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
68. Since the defendant contended that he had contracted only in his capacity as an
officer of a corporation, and was therefore not personally bound by the contract, he argued
that subdivision 5(a) was inapplicable. Id. at 53.
69. The court noted that the signature of the defendant did not affirmatively show rep-
resentative capacity. Id. at 54.
70. Id.
71. 603 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
72. Id. at 302.
73. Id. In making this determination, the court relied on the provision of the Texas
Uniform Commercial Code stating that "[a] signed agreement which excludes modification
• . . except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 2.209(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The court then concluded that a waiver of the
place of payment term was a modification. 603 S.W.2d at 302. But see TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 2.209(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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The pleading allegations necessary to raise the applicability of subdivi-
sion 5(b),74 the "consumer contract" venue provision, were addressed in
Hudman v. John Deere Co. 7 5 Relying on the recent decision in Goudy v.
Lewis, 76 the plaintiff argued that since the defendant had the burden of
proving the facts necessary to invoke subdivision 5(b), he must also specifi-
cally raise the issue in his plea of privilege.77 The court of civil appeals,
however, declined to read Goudy as requiring the raising of specific allega-
tions of facts under subdivision 5(b) in a plea of privilege. 78 Although the
court recognized that subdivision 5(b) facts were an avoidance of applica-
bility of subdivision 5(a), it concluded that the requirement of rule 9479
that matters of avoidance be affirmatively pleaded did not govern venue
pleadings. Instead, the court held that rule 8680 applied, and that general
averments were sufficient to permit the defendant to rely on subdivision
5(b).81 The court further held that the defendant could rebut the plaintiff's
proof under subdivision 5(a) by offering evidence of subdivision 5(b)
facts.8 2 The plaintiff argued that the defendant had purchased equipment
for his business of farming, and therefore no consumer transaction was
involved. The court held, however, that a "consumer transaction" did not
exclude products bought for commercial purposes when the intended use
was agricultural.8 3
In McCullough v. Key8 4 the court considered the type of fraud sufficient
to sustain venue under subdivision 7 of article 1995.85 Although the court
found that the plaintiffs own testimony negated the element of false repre-
sentation, 86 the court concluded that a showing of breach of fiduciary duty
74. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(5)(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982) fixes venue in a suit
brought upon an obligation to pay money arising out of a "consumer transactions" for goods
"intended primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural use."
75. 620 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
76. 599 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ dism'd) (defendant has
burden to prove facts bringing case with subdivision 5(b)).
77. The court noted contrary authority holding that a plaintiff generally has the burden
to prove facts bringing the case within a statutory exception to the defendant's venue right to
be sued at his residence. 620 S.W.2d at 753 (citing Collins v. F.M. Equip. Co., 162 Tex. 423,
424, 347 S.W.2d 575, 577 (1961)).
78. 620 S.W.2d at 753.
79. TEx. R. Civ. P. 94.
80. Id. 86.
81. 620 S.W.2d at 753.
82. In so holding, the court declined to determine what level of proof a plaintiff seeking
to bring the case within the provisions of subdivision 5(a) must offer. Id.
83. Id at 754. In so holding, the court found support by analogy in cases decided under
subdivision 31 of TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995 (Vernon Supp. 1982) which have
held a product purchased by a commercial enterprise to be a consumer good. See, e.g.,
Truckers Equip., Inc. v. Sandoval, 569 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no
writ), discussed in Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J.
455, 462 (1979).
84. 608 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
85. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(7) (Vernon 1964). That subdivision fixes
venue in suits brought to recover for fraud.
86. As the court noted, a plaintiff relying on subdivision 7 must prove, not merely al-
lege, fraud. 608 S.W.2d at 352. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Amburn, 380 S.W.2d 727, 729
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1964, writ dism'd); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. McDaniel,
286 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1956, no writ).
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by a defendant satisfied the fraud requirement of subdivision 7.87 The
court also found that the corporate defendant was incapable of raising a
plea of privilege in a shareholder derivative action since the corporation in
such an action is considered a plaintiff.88
The scope of the term "consumer goods" within the meaning of subdivi-
sion 31 of article 199589 continued to be the subject of judicial construction
during this survey period. Rejecting several earlier decisions,90 the court
in Schwertner v. Nalco Chemical Co. concluded that products intended for
agricultural use were not "consumer goods" under subdivision 31.91 The
court thereby confirmed an earlier holding92 that relied on a narrow defini-
tion of "consumer goods" as set out in the Texas Uniform Commercial
Code.93
The court in John Deere Industrial Equioment Co. v. McMahon Construc-
tion Co .94 was also called upon to construe the meaning of the term "plain-
tiffs" in that portion of subdivision 31 permitting suit "in the county where
the. . . plaintiffs reside" was in question. The defendant-seller in McMa-
hon Construction had brought a third-party indemnity action against the
manufacturer after being sued by the plaintiff-consumer in the county of
plaintiff's residence. Rejecting the defendant-seller's contention that the
reference to "plaintiffs" in subdivision 31 referred to the plaintiff in the
primary suit, the court held that the defendant-seller was to be treated as a
plaintiff insofar as the third-party defendant was concerned. 95 Thus, the
defendant-seller was required to allege and prove its own residence to
maintain venue under subdivision 31.96
Subdivision 29a of article 199597 permits the venue of suits to be main-
tained against "all necessary parties" to an action if the suit is lawfully
maintainable in that county against any party. Two cases during the sur-
vey period considered the term "necessary parties" and found that at least
one of the multiple defendants against whom the plaintiffs sought to main-
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(31) (Vernon Supp. 1982). That subdivision
governs suits for breach of warranty brought against a manufacturer of consumer goods.
90. Truckers Equip., Inc. v. Sandoval, 569 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1978, no writ); Maintenance & Equip. Contractors v. John Deere Co., 554 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ dism'd); Beef Cattle Co. v. N.K. Parrish, Inc.,
553 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ).
91. 615 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1981, writ dism'd). The court refused
to reason by analogy from subdivision 5(b) of art. 1995, which expressly includes goods
intended for agricultural use, that subdivision 31 should also include such goods. See id. at
265-66.
92. L & M Surco Mfg., Inc. v. Winn Title Co., 580 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, writ dism'd).
93. 615 S.W.2d at 266; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 9.109(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
Supp. 1982).
94. 608 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, no writ).
95. Id. at 320.
96. Id.
97. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(29a) (Vernon 1964).
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tain the actions were not such parties.98 In Friday v. Grant Plaza Huntsville
Associates the Texas Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the courts
of civil appeals and held that a guarantor was not a necessary party in a
suit against the principal obligor.99 Similarly, in Portland Savings & Loan
Association v. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Government Securities, Inc. the
court found that agents were not necessary parties in a suit against the
principal.1°° In both cases the test was held to be whether the plaintiff
could obtain complete relief from one defendant, without the joinder of
the others.' 0'
The provisions of article 2212a, 10 2 permitting claims for contribution be-
tween named defendants to be determined in the primary suit, were con-
sidered by two courts during the survey period. In Chadwick v. Mallard &
Mallard, Inc. 103 three defendants, each of whom had cross-claimed for in-
demnity and contribution against the others, filed pleas of privilege, and
one plea was sustained. Reversing the action of the trial court, the court of
civil appeals held that the provisions of section 2(g) of article 2212a were
mandatory and thus required venue of all the claims to be lodged in the
county of plaintiffs primary action. 104
In State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. Hardy10 5
the court considered a more complicated situation involving article 2212a.
The plaintiff had brought a wrongful death action against a state agency
and two private defendants, and the agency had asserted cross-claims for
contribution'against each of its co-defendants. Subsequently, however, the
two co-defendants filed pleas of privilege with respect to plaintiff's wrong-
ful death action and with respect to the agency's contribution claim. Origi-
nally the plaintiff and agency both controverted each of the pleas; the
plaintiff, however, subsequently withdrew its controverting affidavit.
Thereafter the trial court sustained each of the pleas of privilege of the two
co-defendants.
Noting that the Texas Tort Claims Act'0 6 contains a jurisdictional provi-
sion requiring suit against a state agency to be brought in the county where
the case arose, 107 the court concluded that the agency's claims for contri-
bution against the co-defendants were required by article 2212a to be lodg-
ed in the same county. As analyzed by the court, the primary suit to which
98. Friday v. Grand Plaza Huntsville Assocs., 610 S.W.2d 747 (Tex. 1980); Portland
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Gov't Sec., Inc., 619 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
99. 610 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex. 1980).
100. 619 S.W.2d 241, 247-48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
101. 610 S.W.2d at 750; 619 S.W.2d at 247.
102. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
103. 603 S.W.2d 312 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1980, writ dism'd).
104. Id. at 313. The court relied on Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Edwards, 512
S.W.2d 748, 753 (rex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ).
105. 607 S.W.2d 611 (rex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ dism'd).
106. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1982).
107. Id. § 5 (Vernon 1970); see Bishop v. State, 577 S.W.2d 377 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979, no writ) (per curiam) (personal injury suit against state university and State of Texas
dismissed because not fied in county where cause of action arose).
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the claims for contribution related was that brought against the state
agency. 10 8 The court pointed out, however, that article 2212a governed
only the venue of claims for contribution and not the venue of the other
claims against the parties. Accordingly, the court sustained the transfer of
the plaintiffs claims against the co-defendants. 10 9 In so doing, the court
rejected the agency's contentions that it had filed a controverting affidavit
on behalf of the plaintiff that should have been considered by the trial
court." l0 As the court noted, rule 86111 does not give a co-defendant the
right to controvert the plea of privilege filed by another defendant." 12
The National Bank Act 1 3 contains a mandatory provision requiring ac-
tions against national banks to be brought in the county of the bank's
domicile. 14 A notable exception to the requirement exists, however, when
the suit is local rather than transitory. 15 The court in Citizens National
Bank v. Cattleman's Production Credit Association116 interpreted this ex-
ception in a declaratory judgment action instituted to determine the rights
and liabilities of the parties to a deed of trust lien on certain land. After
carefully examining the character of the action brought by the plaintiff and
finding that it was in the nature of a suit to foreclose a mortgage, 1 7 the
court concluded that the suit was one in rem and hence local in charac-
ter."1s Thus, the action did not come within the mandatory venue provi-
sions governing proceedings against a national bank."19
Statutory venue provisions were also the subject of interpretation by the
Texas Supreme Court in Morgan v. Williams. 120 The provision at issue in
that case was article 4656,121 which requires injunctions against inhabit-
ants of Texas to be tried and issued by the court of the defendant's domi-
108. 607 S.W.2d at 614.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 615. the agency had filed a controverting affidavit on plaintiffs behalf after
hearing of the plaintiff's intention to withdraw its own controverting affidavit. Id.
I 11. TEX. R. Civ. P. 86 provides:
A copy of such plea of privilege shall be served on the adverse party or his
attorney of record by actual delivery in person to him or by mailing a copy of
such pleading to him by registered mail return receipt requested. If such ad-
verse party desires to controvert the plea of privilege, he shall within ten days
after he or his attorney of record receive the copy of the plea of privilege file a
controverting plea under oath, setting out specifically the grounds relied upon
to confer venue of such cause.
112. 607 S.W.2d at 615.
113. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-213 (1976).
114. Id. See general y Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35
Sw. L.J. 359, 368 (1981).
115. See Casey v. Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 67 (1880) (established exception for local actions
against national banks).
116. 617 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
117. Id. at 736. Thus, the provisions of subdivision 12 of art. 1995 governing suits for
foreclosure of liens was applicable if not overridden by the National Bank Act. Under sub-
division 12 suit may be brought in the county where the property or any part thereof subject
to such lien is situated.
118. Id. at 737.
119. Id. at 736-37.
120. 610 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1980).
121. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4656 (Vernon 1952).
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ciliary county.' 22 The trial court in Morgan issued a temporary injunction
against a nonresident defendant over his objections that the court lacked
jurisdiction of the case under the provisions of article 4656. On appeal, the
court of civil appeals affirmed on the narrow ground that article 4656 con-
trolled venue only and not jurisdiction. 23 The supreme court reversed,
holding that while the injunction so issued was not void, it was
erroneous. 1
24
In Industrial State Bank v. Engineering Service & Equipment, Inc. 125 the
court considered a number of issues related to the proper presentation of a
plea of privilege. The due order of pleading, the first issue addressed, was
raised by the defendant because the plea of privilege and answer were filed
simultaneously, and the answer did not recite that it was subject to the
plea. The court determined that the due order of pleading was satisfied so
long as the plea was the first of any instrument, in this case the first page,
filed; when one instrument contained both plea and answer in the proper
order, the answer did not have to recite that it was subject to the plea.' 26
A second issue was raised in Engineering Service because the verification
of the plea merely stated that it was true "to the best of [the defendant's]
knowledge, information and belief."' 127 While agreeing that such a verifi-
cation was defective under rule 86,128 the court held that the defect in the
plea did not make the plea void; rather, the defect could be amended and
cured if pointed out by motion or exception under rule 90.129 Moreover,
once amended, the properly verified plea would relate back to the original
filing date. 130
Finally, the court rejected the third contention that the plea was waived
because the defendant sought a protective order against the plaintiffs dep-
osition prior to the hearing. on the plea. Recognizing that discovery is con-
sistent with a plea of privilege,' 3' the court reasoned that the supervision
of such process was likewise consistent with the plea. ' 32 Thus, the defend-
ant did not waive its plea of privilege by seeking the trial court's
protection. 33
Waiver was also the subject of consideration in Donie State Bank v.
122. Exceptions to this rule are recognized in emergency situations, upon proof of the
emergency. Id art. 4643.
123. 603 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980).
124. 610 S.W.2d at 468.
125. 612 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
126. Id. at 663.
127. Id.
128. TEx. R. Civ. P. 86.
129. 612 S.W.2d at 663; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 90, which provides that a defect, omission, or
fault in a pleading, whether in form or substance will be deemed waived if not specifically
raised by written exception and brought to the attention of the trial judge.
130. 612 S.W.2d at 663.
131. The court relied upon the provisions of TEX. R. Civ. P. 88, which expressly states
that the taking of depositions is not a waiver of a plea of privilege. 612 S.W.2d at 664.
132. 612 S.W.2d at 664.
133. Id. The party from whom discovery is taken is thereby put in parity with the party
taking discovery.
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Knight.134 The trial court had scheduled a hearing on the various parties'
motions and, at that hearing, had first considered and ruled upon a motion
for severance before considering the venue question. Pointing out that the
defendants had objected to this order of hearing, had requested that the
plea of privilege be heard first, and had repeatedly stated that the pleas
were not waived, the court held that no intent to waive was present. 35
The applicability of rule 21a 136 to the filing of the controverting affidavit
was addressed by the court in Bentley v. Rio Grande Development Group. 137
The controverting affidavit in Bentley was filed on the thirteenth day after
the plea of privilege was filed. 138 Because service of the plea was effected
by mail, however, the plaintiff argued that the affidavit was timely under
the provisions of rule 21 a permitting three additional days for reply when
an instrument was served by mail. Refusing to follow a line of cases sup-
porting the plaintiffs argument, 139 the Bentley court adhered to author-
ity 140 stressing the literal language of rule 86. '4' Under that approach the
court found that rule 21 a was inapplicable since it specified when service
was to be considered effected, while rule 86 concerned itself not with serv-
ice of a plea of privilege, but receipt of such a plea. 142 Accordingly, the ten
days for filing the controverting affidavit ran, the court held, from receipt
of the plea and not from its service. 143 Furthermore, the fact that the copy
of the plea received by the plaintiff was not marked to indicate that the
plea had actually been filed, was held to be irrelevant. 44
Finally, the supreme court in Corpening v. Corpening145 emphasized the
unqualified right of a defendant to appeal from an order overruling a plea
of privilege. The supreme court reversed the determination by the court of
civil appeals that such an appeal could be summarily dismissed without
oral argument when the record made clear that the plea had been
waived.' 46 Thus the waiver of the plea was held by the supreme court not
to amount to such a waiver of the change of venue issue as to preclude
134. 620 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
135. Id. at 699.
136. TEX. R. Clv. P. 21a.
137. 607 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, no writ).
138. The plea was received by the law librarian of the defendant's attorney, then for-
warded to the attorney, who did not receive it until three days later. Id. at 320.
139. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 568 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978, no writ); Thompson v. Thompson, 487 S.W.2d 436, 438-39
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ); Texas Cemeteries Inc. v. Williams, 459
S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ); Ross v. Katy Employees' Credit
Union, 430 S.W.2d 49, 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, no writ).
140. See, e.g., Wilson v. Groos Nat'l Bank, 535 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976,
no writ).
141. 607 S.W.2d at 321; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 86.
_ 142. 607 S.W.2d at 321. The court stressed that the rule required the controverting affi-
davit to be filed within ten days after the plea of privilege was received. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 322.
145. 615 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1981).





The procedure surrounding sworn account practice was the subject of
some appellate court attention during the survey period in Federal Parts
Corp. v. Robert Bosch Corp. 148 Rule 185 provides that a suit on a sworn
account "shall be taken as prima facie evidence thereof, unless the party
resisting such claim shall . .. file a written denial, under oath, stating
[1] that each and every item is not just or true, or [2] that some specified
item or items are not just and true."' 49 Although the defendant in Robert
Bosch failed to file a verified denial to an action on a sworn account, the
court concluded that such failure merely had the effect of establishing the
account and that the defendant was not foreclosed from defeating the
claim on the basis of an affirmative defense alleged in its answer.' 50
Bluebonnet Farms, Inc. v. Gibraltar Savings Association 15 illustrates the
risk in deferring the assertion of a dilatory plea. After the case had been
on file longer than the applicable limitations period, the defendant submit-
ted an amended answer alleging that the plaintiff corporation lacked the
capacity to sue due to the forfeiture of its charter, and asserting the statute
of limitations as a defense. The defendant also filed a motion for summary
judgment predicated on the limitations defense and, after a hearing on the
matter, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the suit. 152 The
plaintiff appealed the ruling. Emphasizing that the defendant had previ-
ously answered on the merits, had participated in discovery, had allowed
the case to proceed for four years, and had offered no explanation for the
delay in asserting the plea, the court of civil appeals reinstated the suit,
concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion in allowing the
filing of the plea at such a late date.' 53
Several other cases involving question on pleadings were decided during
the survey period. The court in Vanderford v. Hudson, in considering the
filing of an amended petition that omitted a previously named defendant,
ruled that the filing of such an amendment had the effect of dismissing the
party omitted, just as if an order to that effect had been entered by the trial
court.' 54 In addition, two cases concluded that when the recovery of pre-
judgment interest was authorized by statute, a petition containing a gen-
eral prayer for relief was sufficient to support an award of such interest. '
55
147. Id.; cf. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2008 (Vernon 1964) (either party may appeal
judgment sustaining or overruling plea of privilege).
148. 604 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
149. TEX. R. Civ. P. 185.
150. 604 S.W.2d at 369-70; see Rizk v. Financial Guardian Ins. Agency, Inc., 584 S.W.2d
860, 863 (Tex. 1979) (verified denial not nullified by alternative pleading of affirmative
defenses).
151. 618 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ).
152. Id. at 83.
153. Id. at 84.
154. 619 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Allison, 620 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler), rev'd
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VI. LIMITATIONS
The "discovery rule" is a legal principle providing that the applicable
period of limitations runs from the date an injury was or should have been
discovered by a plaintiff, rather than the actual date of the wrongful act. 
156
The applicability of this rule to various causes of action was addressed by
a number of courts during the survey period. In Smith v. Knight, however,
the supreme court expressly reserved the question of the discovery rule's
applicability to legal malpractice cases. 157 The court in McClung v. John-
son displayed no such hesitancy, and rejected application of the discovery
rule in legal malpractice suits. 158 The court, however, refused to apply a
strict date of wrongful act test, holding that the confidential relationship of
attorney and client required a different rule.' 59 Since a fiduciary duty of
disclosure existed, the court concluded that a failure to disclose was a con-
cealment that tolled the limitations period.160 The court further held that
the cessation of the relationship ended any duty to disclose, and thus suit
filed more than two years after the termination of the relationship was
barred. 16 1 The McClung decision is also notable for its affirmation of the
rule that a statute extending a limitations period cannot be applied retroac-
tively to revive a cause of action after the original limitations period has
run. 1
62
InAnderson v. Sneed 63 the court did not reach the issue of the applica-
bility of the discovery rule to legal malpractice. Instead, the court followed
the rule that fraudulent concealment tolls the limitations period. The
court held that an attorney's incorrect representations 64 to his client con-
cerning the legal status of a case could constitute such fraudulent conceal-
ment.' 65 The Anderson court also held that the limitations period for a
malpractice suit for failure to sue wrongdoers began on the last day such
wrongdoers could have been sued. 166 Further, the court held that the re-
on othergounds, 624 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1981); Golden v. Murphy, 611 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ). See also Republic Nat'l Bank v. Northwest
Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 117 (Tex. 1978).
156. See, e.g., Kelley v. Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. 1976), noted in 30 Sw. L.J. 950
(1976); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972); Anderson v. Sneed, 615 S.W.2d 898, 901
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ). See generally Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 407, 414 (1978).
157. 608 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. 1980).
158. 620 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (citing Pack v. Taylor,
584 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Crawford v. Davis, 148
S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1941, no writ)).
159. 620 S.W.2d at 647.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 647-48.
163. 615 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), aft'd, 618 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. 1981).
164. The representations noted by the court included, among other things, statements
that the cause of action that the attorney had been engaged to prosecute had no limitations
period. 615 S.W.2d at 902.
165. Id. at 903.
166. Id. at 900.
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cent amendment of article 5526167 required the application of a four-year
rather than a two-year limitations period to legal malpractice suits.168
In contrast, the court in Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Castillo 169 approved
the application of the discovery rule to a cause of action asserted under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). 170
In this case involving a claim for false representations concerning the con-
struction of a home, the limitations period was held to run from the time
the defects in the completed home first became evident. 171 In a similar case
under the DTPA, Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Chapa,172 a four-year, rather
than a two-year, limitations period was applied. The court rejected the
defendant's claim that the two-year statute173 applied to the action because
it was brought under the DTPA. Analyzing the nature of the claim, the
court applied the four-year statute because the suit arose out of written
representations in a contract. 174 The four-year statute was also held to
apply in Conann Constructors, Inc. v. Muller, involving a suit for breach of
implied warranties. 175 In reaching this determination, the court relied
upon a court holding that an implied warranty is as much a part of a writ-
ten contract as its express terms. 176 Thus, the claim was based on a writ-
ing, and the four-year period was applicable. 177
In addition to cases involving legal malpractice, several decisions were
handed down concerning limitations in other professional malpractice ar-
eas. In Doran v. Compton,178 for example, the Fifth Circuit was called
upon to determine the application of article 5.82,179 the statute of limita-
tions formerly applicable to medical malpractice claims, to a cause of ac-
tion accruing prior to its enactment. The court recognized that the test to
ascertain the retroactivity of such a statute was (1) whether the legislature
intended that result, and (2) whether that result violated the Texas Consti-
tution. 180 Noting that two state courts of civil appeals had reached oppo-
site results concerning the retroactivity of article 5.82,181 the court held that
167. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon Supp. 1982). That amendment ex-
tended from two to four years the limitations period for actions on a debt not evidenced by a
writing. See generally Figari, supra note 39, at 425.
168. The court was careful to note, however, that medical malpractice actions are gov-
erned by a specific two-year stalute. 615 S.W.2d at 904 (citing TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN.
art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1982)).
169. 616 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
170. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
171. 616 S.W.2d at 634.
172. 614 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
173. Id. at 841. The defendant argued that the action should be governed by the former
version of art. 5526, which provided for a two-year limitations period for actions upon debts
not evidenced by a writing. See note 167 supra.
174. 614 S.W.2d at 840-41.
175. 618 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
176. Id. at 566 (citing Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Bell, 422 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. 1968)).
177. 618 S.W.2d at 556-67.
178. 645 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1981).
179. 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 330, § 1, at 864.
180. 645 F.2d at 446.
181. Compare Harvey v. Denton, 601 S.W.2d 121, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding statute not to be retroactive) with Wallace v. Homan & Crimen,
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the legislative intent was that the statute apply prospectively only. 182
Article 5536a 183 prescribes the statute of limitations for wrongful death
suits arising out of defective conditions on real property against persons
who performed construction or repair on improvements on the property.
In Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co. the court held that the statute applied to a
suit against the manufacturer of the elevator, even though the manufac-
turer did not install it.184 The court also rejected a contention that the
statute was unconstitutional as violative of due process and equal protec-
tion, finding that the classifications employed were based on valid
distinctions. 185
VII. PARTIES
In Vondy v. Commissioners Court' 86 the Texas Supreme Court construed
the provisions of rule 39187 governing the joinder of parties. The plaintiff
had brought a mandamus action against a county commissioners' court
and four of the five commissioners; the fifth commissioner was not named
as a party, and no objection to his absence was registered. The court of
civil appeals, however, raised the commissioner's absence on its own mo-
tion and held his omission from the action to be fundamental error be-
cause he was an indispensable party. 188 On appeal to the supreme court,
that determination was reversed. 189 Noting that a party is very rarely so
indispensable as to deprive a court of jurisdiction by his absence, 190 the
court determined that complete relief could be given in this case without
the fifth commissioner since the commissioners' court itself was a party, as
well as a majority of the individual commissioners. 191 The fifth commis-
sioner therefore could not be considered indispensable. 192
A number of courts during the survey period dealt with class action cer-
tification. 193 Calaway v. Foxhall'94 emphasized the importance of filing a
timely motion for class certification. 195 The failure of the attorney to make
Inc., 584 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding statute to be
retroactive and constitutional).
182. 645 F.2d at 452-53.
183. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
184. 618 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
185. Id. at 873-75.
186. 620 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1981).
187. TEX. R. Civ. P. 39.
188. 601 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980).
189. 620 S.W.2d at 107.
190. Id. at 106 (quoting Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974)).
191. 620 S.W.2d at 107.
192. Id. The case was thus distinguishable from Gaal v. Townsend, 77 Tex. 464, 14 S.W.
365 (1890) in which the absence of a county official was held fatal because only a majority of
the officials could perform the act requested and the plaintiff had failed to name a majority
as defendants.
193. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(1), which directs the court to determine whether the action
is to be maintained as a class action as soon as practicable after commencement of the suit.
194. 603 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1980, no writ).
195. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 578 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1979, writ refd n.r.e.), discussed in Figari, supra note 39, at 426.
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such a motion until after the original plaintiffs case became moot was held
fatal to attempts to keep the suit alive as a class action. 96 Stagner v.
Friendswood Development Co. 197 made clear that a judgment entered in
the form of a class action was improper when no certification of a class had
ever taken place. The fact that the plaintiffs had alleged that suit was
brought on behalf of a class was therefore insufficient to permit judgment
to be entered in favor of such a class.' 98
In Jones v. City of Dallas199 the taxpayer-plaintiffs sought to maintain a
class action to restrain the city from certifying, adopting, or enforcing ad
valorem tax assessments on residential property. The named plaintiffs,
however, failed to offer any evidence in support of their certification mo-
tion. The trial court held that as a matter of law the action was not one
appropriate for class treatment. On appeal the court of civil appeals af-
firmed, noting that under substantive law each taxpayer was required to
prove substantial individual injury.2°° In addition, the court concluded
that having offered no evidence in support of certification, the plaintiffs
failed to show abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to certify.20'
VIII. DISCOVERY
During the survey period the Texas Legislature created a limited physi-
cian-patient privilege. 20 2 The Act precludes disclosure of communications
from a person licensed to practice medicine in connection with any profes-
sional services as a physician to a patient.203 Records of the "identity, di-
agnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient. . . created or maintained by
a physician" are also designated as privileged. 2°4
Several types of exceptions to the privilege, however, are created ex-
pressly. No privilege may be claimed in a court proceeding: (1) When the
proceeding is brought by the patient against the physician;20 5 (2) when the
196. 578 S.W.2d at 172.
197. 613 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), writ refdn.r.eper curiam, 620 S.W.2d
103 (Tex. 1981).
198. Accordingly, the judgment was reformed to delete class references. 613 S.W.2d at
795.
199. 604 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980, writ dism'd).
200. Id. at 544. Presumably this would prevent common questions of law or fact from
predominating over individual ones, thus making class certification improper under TEX. R.
Civ. P. 42(b)(3).
201. 604 S.W.2d at 544. Although not explicitly relied upon, the court noted that the
alleged class would contain some 200,000 members, thus suggesting that serious difficulties
would be raised with regard to manageability of the class. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42.
202. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.08 (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides that
"[c]ommunications between one licensed to practice medicine, relative to or in connection
with any professional services as a physician to a patient, is [sic] confidential and privileged
and may not be disclosed except as provided in this section." See id. art. 5561h, §§ 1-6
(confidentiality of mental health information). See generally Figari, supra note 39, at 428-
29.
203. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.08(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982). A "patient"
is defined as "any person who consults or is seen by a person licensed to practice medicine to
receive medical care." 1d. § 5.08(m).
204. Id. § 508(b).
205. Id. § 508(g)(1).
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proceeding is a criminal or license revocation action in which the patient is
a complaining witness;206 (3) when the patient or his representative waives
his privilege in writing;20 7 (4) when the proceeding is to collect on a claim
for medical services rendered to the patient;20 8 (5) when the proceeding is
brought by the patient or his representative to recover monetary damages
for any physical or mental condition of the patient; 20 9 (6) when the pro-
ceeding is before a court or administrative body having jurisdiction over
the subject matter, and the governing rules of procedure authorize discov-
ery of the information;210 (7) involving a disciplinary investigation of a
physician conducted under the Act;211 (8) involving a criminal investiga-
tion of a physician;21 2 and (9) when the disclosure is relevant to any one of
several involuntary civil commitment or hospitalization proceedings. 213
The physician is also expressly authorized to disclose information pro-
tected under the Act: (1) to governmental agencies required or authorized
by law to receive it;214 (2) to medical or law enforcement personnel if a
probability exists that the patient may physically harm himself or others or
suffer immediate mental or emotional injury;215 (3) to qualified personnel
performing management audits, financial audits, program evaluations, or
research;216 (4) to the extent necessary in the collection of fees for medical
services; 217 (5) to persons having a written consent of the patient or those
having legal authority to act for the patient;218 (6) to persons or entities
involved in the payment or collection of fees for medical services; 219 or
(7) to other physicians or medical personnel participating in the diagnosis,
evaluation, or treatment of the patient.220
The Act provides that the patient, or physician acting on his behalf, may
claim the privilege. 22' Further, the Act appears to be retroactive in its ap-
plication. 222 Finally, the Act provides that a person aggrieved by a viola-
tion of the Act may seek an injunction or bring a civil action for
206. Id.
207. Id. § 5.08(g)(2). The Act provides that the consent "must be in writing and signed
by the patient" and specify the information covered, the reasons for the release, and the
person to whom the information is to be released. Id. § 5.08(h)(1). Moreover, the patient
has the right to withdraw his consent to the release at any time; such withdrawal does not,
however, affect any information disclosed prior to written notice of the withdrawal. Id.
§ 5.080)(2).
208. Id. § 5.08(g)(3).
209. Id. § 5.08(g)(4).
210. Id.
211. Id. § 5.08(g)(5).
212. Id. § 5.08(g)(6).
213. Id. § 5.08(g)(7).
214. Id. § 5.08(h)(1).
215. Id. § 5.08(h)(2).
216. Id. § 5.08(h)(3).
217. Id. § 5.08(h)(4).
218. Id. § 5.08(h)(5).
219. Id. § 5.08(h)(6).
220. Id. § 5.08(h)(7).
221. Id. §§ 5.08(e); (f).
222. Id. § 5.08(d). See generally Exparte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255, 262 (Tex. 1981) (up-




Under prior law, no type of physician-patient privilege existed in
Texas.224 By enacting the privilege set forth in article 4495b, Texas joins a
growing number of states that have recognized a privilege for communica-
tions made in connection with professional services to a patient.225
The legislative action affecting discovery was not the only attention the
area received during the survey period; the rules of procedure governing
discovery were the subject of several noteworthy opinions. In Elkins v.
Jones226 the rule at issue was rule 169,227 governing requests for admis-
sions of fact. The appellant had neither served responses to requests
within the time allowed, nor sought any additional time within which to
serve the responses. After the trial court had issued an order deeming the
requests admitted, summary judgment was entered against the appellant
on the basis of such admissions. On appeal, the court of civil appeals
rejected the appellant's argument that the order deeming the requests ad-
mitted was invalid because it was issued without notice or hearing. 228 The
court observed that rule 169 was automatic in its operation, and unan-
swered requests deemed admitted, regardless of whether the trial court en-
tered an order to that effect.229 Indeed, the court held that in such a
situation the burden was on the appellant to file a motion and seek a hear-
ing to avoid having the requests deemed admitted. 230 In contrast, the ap-
pellant in Eskew v. Johnston Printing Co. was held not to be bound by his
failure to answer requests for admission in a timely fashion.23' The court
based its decision on the fact that the proponent of the admissions, by
asking for a legal conclusion rather than an admission of a fact, had failed
to comply with rule 169, and therefore the request was not binding.232
The use of a deposition against a party who was not joined in the suit
until after the deposition was taken was considered by the court in Safeco
Insurance Co. v. Goson .233 The deposition in question had been taken
from one defendant prior to the time that Safeco had been made a party to
the action; Safeco argued that the deposition was hearsay and should not
have been admitted into evidence against it. The appellate court con-
223. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.08(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
224. See, e.g., Caddo Grocery & Ice v. Carpenter, 285 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1955, no writ). The majority of states, however, have recognized such a privilege.
See 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 2380, at 819 n.5 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
225. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 224, § 2286, at 75 nn.22b, 23 (Supp. 1979).
226. 613 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
227. TEX. R. Civ. P. 169. See generaly Bush, Rule 169.: An Overview, 44 TEX. B.J. 1049
(1981).
228. 613 S.W.2d at 534.
229. Id.; accord, Packer v. First Tex. Sav. Ass'n, 567 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-East-
land 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
230. 613 S.W.2d at 534.
231. 615 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, no writ).
232. Id. The request in question sought an admission that the first paragraph of a speci-
fied letter "states that Defendant promised to pay to Plaintiff $19,000." Id.
233. 619 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
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cluded, however, that because counsel for Safeco had been present at the
deposition, and because Safeco was the insurer of a named party at the
time of the discovery, it was not such a stranger to the suit as to justify
exclusion of the deposition. 234
The failure of a party to disclose the identity of a witness in response to
interrogatories resulted in the exclusion of the witness's testimony in Texas
Employers' Insurance Association v. Meyer.23-S The problem arose when
plaintiff, in an interrogatory, requested a list of witnesses defendant ex-
pected to call. Defendant agreed to provide the information when it be-
came available. Prior to trial the defendant informed plaintiff that he did
not anticipate having any witnesses, even though he had knowledge of a
particular witness's identity, testimony, and willingness to testify. On the
basis of these facts the trial court refused to admit the testimony of the
witness in question. The appellate court affirmed the exclusion of the testi-
mony by the trial court, concluding it was within the discretion of the trial
court to impose sanctions for failure to comply with discovery. 236
Disbarment proceedings generated two significant decisions in the area
of discovery during the survey period. In Greenspan v. State237 the appel-
lant assigned as error the trial court's overruling of his motion to produce
the transcript of the testimony presented to the grievance committee.
Based on its analysis of rule 167, authorizing production of documents and
tangible items, the court held that the rules of civil procedure govern such
proceedings.238 Noting that the rule239 excepted from discovery written
statements of witnesses that were made subsequent to the transaction that
was the basis of suit and that were made in connection with the investiga-
tion of the claim, the court concluded that the requested transcript fell into
that category and hence was not discoverable. 24°
In Mclnnis v. State,241 another disbarment proceeding, the defendant
attempted to exclude certain evidence on the grounds that it had been im-
properly discovered by the state.242 The court, however, approved the ad-
mission of the evidence because such proceedings were civil and not
criminal in nature.243 Despite its suggestion that the exclusionary rule was
234. Id. at 278. The court was careful to distinguish cases in which a plaintiff sought to
use his own deposition against a defendant who was a stranger to the action at the time of
the deposition. See, e.g., Academy Welding v. Carnes, 535 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); Heldt Bros. Trucks v. Silva, 464 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1971, no writ).
235. 620 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
236. Id. at 180.
237. 618 S.W.2d 939 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
238. Id. at 940. (citing STATE BAR OF TEXAS, RULES & CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY, art. 12, § 21 (1973)).
239. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 167(2).
240. 618 S.W.2d at 941.
241. 618 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
242. Among other acts, the discovery complained of included surreptitious tape record-




inapplicable to civil proceedings, 244 the court also held that the actions of
the state were not so improper as to require exclusion. 245
In Exparte Abell a sharply divided Texas Supreme Court issued a de-
tailed decision regarding the mental health information privilege enacted
by the Texas Legislature in 1979.246 The issue before the court was
whether a psychologist-defendant sued by two former patients for engag-
ing in sexual intercourse with them during treatment could be required to
reveal whether he had engaged in similar acts with other patients and, if
so, the names of such patients. The defendant had refused to disclose such
matters even after the trial court had ordered him to disclose. 247 While
contempt proceedings were in progress, however, the Texas Legislature
passed article 5561h protecting communications between mental health
professionals and patients as well as records of the identity and treatment
of such patients.248 The supreme court first determined that article 5561h
could be applied retroactively because it created a privilege relating to the
admissibility of evidence, and thus was procedural in nature. 249 Since ret-
roactive application of procedural law did not violate the Texas Constitu-
tion,250 the court reasoned that article 5561h could be applied. The
majority then concluded that the statute forbade disclosure of patients'
identities through the attempted discovery.25' Expanding the statute even
further, the majority held that the general inquiry into whether the defend-
ant had conducted sexual activities with other patients was likewise
barred. 252 In reaching these conclusions the majority ignored the literal
language of the statute, which, as the dissent pointed out, protects only
"communications" and "records. ' 253
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The supreme court discussed the probative effect of an affidavit of an
interested party in the context of a summary judgment contest in Ameri-
244. Id. But see Day & Zimmermann v. Strickland, 483 S.W.2d 541, 547 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (affirming exclusion of illegally discovered evi-
dence from use in trial of a civil suit). See generally Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 182, 187 (1973).
245. 618 S.W.2d at 393.
246. 613 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1981) (5-4 decision); see TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5561h (Vernon 1979), discussed in Cardwell, Discovery and Release of Mental Health Records
AfterArticle 5561h, 44 TEX. B. J. 1114 (1981). See generally Figari, supra note 39, at 428-29.
247. The trial court had attempted to minimize the intrusiveness of its order by subject-
inthe discovery to protections such as sealing the information discovered. 613 S.W.2d at
248. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h, §§ 2(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
249. 613 S.W.2d at 262. The court also noted, however, that the statute related to protec-
tion of a privacy right of the patient.
250. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16.
251. 613 S.W.2d at 263. The justices rejected the attempted "protections" imposed by
the trial court as insufficient to protect the privacy of patients since, once identified, they
could be subpoenaed to testify. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 263-64.
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cana Motel, Inc. v. Johnson ,254 a suit to recover for supplies allegedly sold
by the plaintiff. The corporate defendant moved for a summary judgment,
and filed an accompanying affidavit by its manager that contained a denial
of "any dealings" with defendant. 255 The trial court granted a summary
judgment on the basis of the affidavit; but on review the court of civil ap-
peals discounted the probative effect to be given the affidavit, and re-
versed. 256 The supreme court, finding that the manager's affidavit was
clear, direct, positive, and without contradiction in the record, held that it
was sufficiently probative, and summary judgment was property
granted. 257
Two decisions rendered during the survey period illustrate the range of
discretion that may be exercised by a trial court in deciding whether to
consider posthearing summary judgment proof. In Central Texas Decorat-
ing Center v. Mutual Savings Institution258 the plaintiff failed to file any
response or affidavits in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary
judgment until two weeks after the hearing on the motion. 259 In view of
the tardiness of the filing of the affidavits, the appellate court found that
the trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to consider them,
and concluded that a summary judgment in favor of the defendant was
correctly entered.260 By comparison, in Carney's Lumber Co. v. Lincoln
Mortgage Investors261 the trial court considered summary judgment evi-
dence that was submitted nearly eleven months after a hearing on cross-
motions for summary judgment. The proof considered was a corrected
order entered by a bankruptcy court concerning the same realty that was
involved in the state court action. Noting that the opposing party had
notice of the bankruptcy proceeding and had an opportunity to respond to
the additional evidence, the court of civil appeals concluded that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in considering the corrected order.262
Finally, the timeliness of the notice for a summary judgment hearing
was considered in Gulf Refining Co. v. A.F G Management, 34 Ltd.263 Ap-
pealing from a summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff contended that the notice received by it of the hearing was insuffi-
cient. Although the motion had been served, in accordance with rule 166-
254. 610 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam).
255. Id. at 143; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(c), governing summary judgment practice,
which provides that "[a] summary judgment may be based on uncontroverted testimonial
evidence of an interested witness if the evidence is clear, positive and direct, otherwise
credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily
controverted."
256. 604 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980).
257. 610 S.W.2d at 143-44; accord, Barham v. Sugar Creek Nat'l Bank, 612 S.W.2d 78
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
258. 607 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
259. Id. at 315.
260. Id. at 316.
261. 610 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, no writ).
262. Id. at 841-42.
263. 605 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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A,26 4 more than twenty-one days prior to the hearing, no date for the hear-
ing was specified in the motion, and the plaintiff did not receive notice of
the hearing until fifteen days before it was held. The defendant argued
that the twenty-one day requirement of rule 166-A related only to the
filing of the motion in advance of the hearing, and that the notice of the
hearing was governed by the three-day requirement of rule 21a.265 Re-
jecting the defendant's argument, the court of civil appeals concluded that
the twenty-one day requirement of rule 166-A was applicable to both the
filing of the motion and the advance notice of the hearing. A contrary
construction, observed the court, would allow the movant to "delay giving
notice of the hearing until three days prior thereto and thereby deprive the
opposing party of a reasonable opportunity to serve affidavits or other
written response. '26
6
X. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION
During the survey period some notable decisions were handed down
concerning special issues in Texas. The former requirement that special
issues be submitted distinctly and separately was abolished,267 and rule
277 now provides that "[it shall be discretionary with the court whether to
submit separate questions with respect to each element of a case or to sub-
mit issues broadly," and that "[ilt shall not be objectionable that a question
is general or includes a combination of elements or issues. '268 Giving this
language full effect, the supreme court in Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls ap-
proved a broad submission of negligent omissions in a form that inquired
whether, on the occasion in question, the defendant "failed to follow ap-
proved safety practices for pulling wet tubing. '269 Similarly, in Gray v.
West a court of civil appeals found acceptable the submission of a single
issue inquiring whether one party "became a partner or joint adventurer"
in a particular business with any one of several other parties, followed by a
definition of "partnership" and "joint adventure. '270
Under former practice the trial judge was required to frame his charge
264. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A provides that "[e]xcept on leave of court, with notice to op-
posing counsel, the motion and any supporting affidavits shall be filed and served at least
twenty-one days before the time specified for hearing."
265. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a provides that "[i]f the time of service is not elsewhere pre-
scribed, the adverse party is entitled to three days notice of a motion."
266. 605 S.W.2d at 349.
267. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (Vernon 1967). See generally Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., Ill
Tex. 461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922).
268. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277. See generally Pope, The State of the Special Verdict, 1 I ST.
'MARY'S L.J. 1 (1979); Pope & Lowerre, RevisedfRule 277-.4 Better Special Verdict Systemfor
Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577 (1973); Spradley, The Global Issue: Outlaw of the Special Issue Prac-
tice, 18 Hous. L. REv. 1 (1980).
269. 616 S.W.2d 911, 924 (Tex. 1981). Additionally, the court endorsed the definition of
gross negligence suggested in I STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES
3.11, at 70 (1969) to the effect that: "'Heedless and reckless disregard' means more than
momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error of judgment. It means such an entire
want of care as to indicate that the act or omission in question was the result of conscious
indifference to the rights, welfare, or safety of the persons affected by it." 616 S.W.2d at 920.
270. 608 S.W.2d 771, 775-76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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so that he did "not therein comment on the weight of the evidence." '27'
This phrase was deleted by the 1973 amendments to the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure,272 and the trial judge is now prohibited only from com-
menting directly on the weight of the evidence3 73 While this amendment
relaxed the applicable standard, the court in Capital Title Co. v. Mahone
reiterated that a submission to the jury that assumed a disputed material
fact was never a permissible comment on the weight of the evidence, and
therefore constituted reversible error.274
While a portion of rule 277 requires that "the court shall submit such
explanatory instructions. . . as shall be proper to enable the jury to render
a verdict," 275 the directive does not apply in every instance. In Daniels v.
Southwestern Transportation ,276 the court concluded, on the basis of an
earlier case, 277 that the trial court had correctly refused to instruct the jury
on circumstantial evidence. 278
No area of special issue practice is more difficult than the determination
of irreconcilable conflict between jury findings. In Shop Rite Foods, Inc. v.
Upjohn Co .279 the court was confronted with two findings that were appar-
ently inconsistent. The court stated that the situation did not present "the
traditional irreconcilable conflict which exists when the answer to one is-
sue would establish a cause of action or defense while the other would
destroy it."'280 Furthermore, the court found applicable the exception that
"when a party relies on one of several alternative theories of recovery or
defenses and the jury's answers to such theories are seemingly inconsistent
or illogical, there is no fatal conflict in the verdict."' 28' Accordingly, the
court refused to reverse the judgment on grounds of irreconcilable con-
flict.2 82 The court in Ryan v. Huber,283 on the other hand, invoked the
doctrine of judicial notice to determine that an irreconcilable conflict ex-
isted between two findings of the jury. In Ryan, a suit to recover for per-
sonal injuries, the jury found that the plaintiff had been injured, and that
as a result she was incapacitated. The jury, however, refused to find that
the plaintiff experienced any pain and suffering. Taking judicial notice of
the fact that if there was an injury to a person it was accompanied by pain,
271. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272 (1967).
272. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272; see Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 36 TEX. B.J. 495 (1973).
273. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
274. 619 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ); accord,
Otto Vehle & Reserve Law Officers Ass'n v. Brenner, 590 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1979, no writ); City of Beaumont v. Fuentez, 582 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ); Cactus Drilling Co. v. Williams, 525 S.W.2d 902, 906-07
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
275. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
276. 621 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
277. Johnson v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 232, 205 S.W.2d 353
(1947).
278. 621 S.W.2d at 191.
279. 619 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
280. Id. at 583.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. 618 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).
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the court found "irreconcilable conflict to have resulted by the finding of
injury occasioning incapacity of plaintiff, with damages assessed therefor,
while at the same time there was a refusal to make a finding in award of
any amount for the plaintiffs pain and suffering. '284 The case was there-
fore reversed and remanded. 285
XI. JURY PRACTICE
Rule 216 requires that a jury demand be made, and the jury fee be paid
"on or before appearance day or, if thereafter, a reasonable time before the
date set for trial of the cause on the nonjury docket, but not less than ten
days in advance. '286 In Martinez v. Department of Human Resources287
the jury demand was made ten days prior to the date set for trial. Finding
that a jury was unavailable and that obtaining one would have caused an
unreasonable delay, the trial court held the demand to be untimely. Af-
firming the ruling on the circumstances of the case, the court of civil ap-
peals cautioned "that a demand made ten days in advance is not
necessarily timely as a matter of law."' 288 Similarly, in Coleman v. Sad-
ler 289 a jury demand was made by the defendant thirteen days prior to a
trial setting, and the trial court found it to be untimely. Concluding that
the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to allow a jury trial, the
appellate court reversed, observing that "[w]hen a jury demand is made
more than ten days in advance of the date set for trial, such demand is
presumed to be made within a reasonable time."' 290 Further, the court
found that the presumption had not been rebutted because the record
failed to show that a jury trial would have operated to injure the plaintiff,
disrupt the trial court's docket, or seriously interfere with the ordinary
handling of the lower court's business. 29 1 Coleman is also significant be-
cause the appellate court held that the defendant had not waived his right
to a jury trial by announcing "ready" at the call of the trial docket. 292
Although rule 233 provides that "[e]ach party to a civil suit shall be
entitled to six peremptory challenges in a case tried in the district
court, ' 2 9 3 the fact that a person is named as a party to a suit does not in
itself entitle him to six strikes. 294 In order for two defendants to be entitled
284. Id. at 890.
285. Id.
286. TEX. R. Civ. P. 216.
287. 620 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
288. Id. at 808 (quoting Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d 866, 877 (Tex.
1968)); accord Young v. Young, 589 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ
dism'd); Jackson v. Jackson, 524 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ);
Sylvester v. Griffin, 507 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
289. 608 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
290. Id. at 346; accord First Bankers Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 417 S.W.2d 738, 739 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1967, no writ); Jerrell v. Jerrell, 409 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1966, no writ).
291. 608 S.W.2d at 346.
292. Id.
293. TEX. R. Civ. P. 223.
294. See, e.g., Retail Credit Co. v. Hyman, 316 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
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to more than six peremptory challenges between them, the interests of
those defendants must be antagnostic on an issue with which the jury is
concerned. 295 Article 2151a, which interacts with rule 233, states that
"[a]fter proper alignment of parties, it shall be the duty of the court to
equalize the number of peremptory challenges provided under Rule 233
...in accordance with the ends of justice so that no party is given an
unequal advantage. ' 296 In Williams v. Texas City Refining, Inc.2 9 7 the
plaintiff claimed that the trial court had erred in apportioning seven strikes
to the defendant and one strike to the third-party defendant, while only
allowing six strikes to the plaintiff. Noting that in most cases a two-to-one
ratio of strikes is the maximum disparity allowable between sides, the
court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion in its manner
of apportioning the strikes, primarily because the disparity was less than
the usual ratio.298 In Employers Casualty Co. v. Peterson the court of civil
appeals found no error on the part of the trial court in allowing the plain-
tiff eight strikes and the defendant and third-party defendant four strikes
each. 299 Since there was no antagonism on a jury issue between the de-
fendant and the third-party defendant, the court concluded that each side
must receive the same number of peremptory challenges. 3°°
The court in Peterson also discussed the propriety of the jury argument
of counsel for the plaintiff that referred to the refusal of the third-party
defendant to testify based on his fifth amendment right.30 1 Holding that
criminal and civil cases must be treated differently for purposes of this
issue since a party's guilt is not at issue in a civil case, the court implied
that the comment was not prohibited. The court concluded that even if the
comment was improper, the trial court had cured the error by admonishing
the jury not to consider the statement. 30 2
Rule 223303 governs the method for obtaining a general jury panel list in
counties that have interchangeable juries. This rule provides that, after a
general panel has been selected,
the trial judge upon the demand of any party [to a jury case] .. shall
cause the names of all the members of the general panel . . . to be
placed in a receptacle and well shaken, and ...shall then draw
therefrom the names of a sufficient number of jurors from which a
ton 1958, writ refd). If several litigants have essentially common interests and are not an-
tagonistic on an issue of fact, they are considered to be only one "party" under TEX. R. Civ.
P. 233. Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. 1974).
295. See Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. 1973). See also O'Day v.
Sakowitz Bros., 462 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
296. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2151a (Vernon Supp. 1982). A leading case on the
proper procedure for alignment of parties is Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914
(Tex. 1979).
297. 617 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
298. Id. at 826-27.
299. 609 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
300. Id.
301. Id. at 589.
302. Id.
303. TEx. R. Civ. P. 223.
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jury may be selected to try [the case] .... 304
Davis v. Huey305 held that a party had a right to "reshuffle" the jury list
after the list was sent to a particular court, regardless of whether the clerk
had previously reshuffled the list, and even if the party has examined the
jury list prior to making the demand.3°6 Davis also addressed the practice
by some jurors of taking notes during trial.30 7 The court recognized that
"the chief objection to such practice is the possibility that the notes might
be regarded by jurors as evidence and not merely a device to refresh the
recollection of the evidence. '30 8 Because the record contained no indica-
tion that the jurors had considered the notes as evidence, however, no error
was found.309
Finally, two decisions during the survey period considered issues related
to the removal of jurors on grounds of disability. Prior to the presentation
of evidence, a juror in Daniels v. Southwestern Transportation310 was re-
moved from the panel due to a heart ailment. The court quoted section 13
of article V of the Texas Constitution, 311 the basis of rule 292,312 which
provides that "when, pending the trial of any case, one or more jurors not
exceeding three may ...be disabled .... the remainder of the jury"
may render a verdict.313 The court held that a cause was considered pend-
ing under rule 292 "when the parties have announced ready and the jury
has been selected and sworn. 314 Accordingly, the court of civil appeals
concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in dismissing
the juror, and affirmed the case on this issue.315 In Remuda Oil & Gas Co.
v. Nobles316 a juror was removed due to his unavailability caused by
weather conditions. Rejecting the contention that a juror may only be re-
moved when he is physically or mentally disabled, the court stated that
"[i]llness, mental disability, misconduct, drunkeness or otherfacts are sub-
ject to the discretionary consideration of the trial court in determining
disability.,, 317
304. Id.
305. 608 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 620 S.W.2d
561 (Tex. 1981).
306. 608 S.W.2d at 953-54.
307. For cases discussing the practice of jurors' taking notes, see English v. American &
Foreign Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ); Manges v.
Willoughby, 505 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Guest v.
American Petrofina Co., 485 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, no writ).
308. 608 S.W.2d at 955.
309. Id.
310. 621 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
311. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 13.
312. TEX. R. Civ. P. 292.
313. 621 S.W.2d at 19 (emphasis added).
314. 621 S.W.2d at 191; accord Thomas v. Billingsley, 173 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1943, writ refd).
315. 621 S.W.2d at 191. See generally Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Peralez, 546 S.W.2d
88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); Dickson v. J. Weingarten Inc.,
498 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
316. 613 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, no writ).




Several cases decided during the survey period considered the propriety
of prejudgment interest awards. In First City National Bank v. Haynes318
the court was required to decide the proper rate for an award of equitable
prejudgment interest. 319 The court first noted the lack of uniformity
among the various courts that had been confronted with this issue,320 as
well as the recent refusal of the Texas Supreme Court to address it.321
Then, recognizing a recent trend to hold the award of such interest within
the trial court's discretion, the court reasoned by analogy that the rate of
that award could also be discretionary. 322 Implicit in the court's decision,
however, was the requirement that any rate so selected be lawful.323
In City ofAustin v. Foster324 the court addressed the propriety of award-
ing compound prejudgment interest in connection with a condemnation
award. 325 Over a dissent arguing that equity jurisdiction would allow the
compounding of statutory interest when market rates were higher than the
simple legal rate,326 the majority of the court declined to permit the award
for several reasons. 327 First, the court noted the difficulties involved in
calculating such interest when no contract or agreement between the par-
ties set the "rests" or settlements between principal and interest. 32 8 Sec-
ondly, the court held that even if compound interest would be appropriate
in certain cases, the failure of the plaintiffs to move forward to trial
promptly, thus increasing the damages, rendered it improper in the instant
case.329 Further, the court condemned the award of such interest by the
trial court without notice and hearing.330
Lack of hearing was also held fatal to the judgment rendered by the trial
S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ); 3 R. McDONALD, TEXAS
CIVIL PRACTICE § 11.14 (rev. ed. 1970).
318. 614 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1981, no writ).
319. The test applied by the court in determining the propriety of prejudgment interest
was whether a specific sum of money was due on a date certain prior to judgment. The court
held that the date of filing suit could be used where all breaches giving rise to damages had
occurred by then. Id. at 610.
320. Id.
321. See Maxey v. Texas Commerce Bank, 580 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1979).
322. 614 S.W.2d at 610 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d
480 (Tex. 1978)).
323. The court explicitly noted that "[t]he rate selected in this case is a lawful rate." 614
S.W.2d at 610.
324. No. 13-341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin, June 10, 1981) (unreported case with a 2-1
decision).
325. The interest was compounded based on the rate of 6% per annum fixed by TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1981). No. 13-341 at 1.
326. No. 13-341 at 5.
327. The significance of compounding is well illustrated by this case, in which the appli-
cation of compounded interest would have increased the prejudgment interest awarded by
more than $10,000.
328. No. 13-341 at 2. As the court viewed it, no logical method existed for determining
when interest became past due so as itself to become an interest bearing debt. Id. at 2-3.
329. Id at 4. The court was careful to point out that the defendant had not been dila-
tory. Id.
330. Id. at 4-5. The court nevertheless stated that such interest might be allowable if
alleged and adjudicated at trial. Id. at 4.
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court in Reitmeyer v. Charm Craft Publisher.331 The defendant had filed
an answer with the clerk, but the trial court had nevertheless entered a
default judgment because the answer was missing from the case file. Con-
demning this procedure, the court of civil appeals also held that the fact
that the answer to the suit on sworn account was unverified did not war-
rant a default judgment.332
XII. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
In two cases decided during the survey period the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the proper procedure for a party seeking to complain of the re-
fusal of a court of civil appeals to grant an extension of time pursuant to
rule 2 1c. 33 3 In Banales v. Jackson334 the court of civil appeals had denied
an appellant's motion for an extension of time in which to file for rehear-
ing. The appellant then filed an interlocutory appeal from the order deny-
ing his motion. 335 The supreme court first emphasized that the
interlocutory appeal was the appropriate vehicle for challenge of the action
by the court of civil appeals; in this instance an application for writ of error
would have been improper since the motion for rehearing was itself a pre-
requisite to such an application. 336 The court then catalogued the matters
that should be included in the record of such an appeal, listing (1) the
petition for review detailing the facts, (2) a copy of the rule 21c motion,
(3) the supporting affidavits, (4) the certificate of the clerk, and (5) a
brief.337 Finally, the court stated that the motion seeking review of the
lower court's denial must be filed within thirty days of such action. 338
In Sears v. State339 the appellant also sought an interlocutory review of
the denial of a motion to extend under rule 2 lc. Distinguishing the facts of
Banales, the court held that such review was available only when the ex-
tension sought was related to a motion for rehearing. 34° When the exten-
sion was sought in order to extend the time in which to file the
transcript,341 the court concluded that the proper procedure was for the
331. 619 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no writ).
332. Id. at 442.
333. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c specifies the procedure for requesting and obtaining a determi-
nation of motions to extend the time for filing transcript, statement of facts, and motion for
rehearing in the court of civil appeals, and application for writ of error in the supreme court.
334. 610 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1980).
335. The appellant filed an application in the supreme court to review the decision of the
court of civil appeals. Id. at 733.
336. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 458, 468-469.
337. 610 S.W.2d at 733.
338. Id.
339. 610 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. 1980).
340. Id. at 734-35.
341. The appellant had failed to timely fie the transcript because he had relied upon the
district clerk to do so after affirmatively answering the clerk's inquiry as to whether he
wished it fied. The court of civil appeals held that this was not a reasonable explanation
within the meaning of TEX. R. Civ. P. 21c since the clerk was under no official duty to
forward the transcript to the court. Sears v. State, 605 S.W.2d 375, 376-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1980).
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court of civil appeals to render a final judgment. 342 The appellant could
then seek rehearing, and perfect an appeal by writ of error.343
A motion to extend was also the subject of Smith v. King,344 in which
appellants sought an extension of time under rule 356(b) 345 in order to file
their cost bond. Construing the recently amended provisions of that rule,
the court held that filing the motion to extend one month after the bond
was originally due did not satisfy the rule. 346 According to the court, the
motion to extend and the bond itself must be filed within fifteen days of
the original due date, and compliance with that time limit was
jurisdictional. 347
The essential content of the cost bond was addressed by the court in
Conann Constructors, Inc. v. Muller.348 A plaintiff had obtained judgment
against certain defendants who had in turn obtained an indemnity award
against a third-party defendant. The bond filed by the third-party defend-
ant referred only to the judgment awarded against him, and failed to men-
tion the judgment awarded to the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff
argued, the third-party defendant had failed to perfect an appeal as to him.
Rejecting this contention, the court held that the scope of appeal may be
limited only by notice in compliance with rule 353.349 As the court saw it,
an appeal could not be limited to a particular portion of the judgment by
inadvertent omission in the cost bond.350
In Cameron & Willacy Counties Community Projects, Inc. v. Gonzalez,351
however, the appellant complied with the requirements of rule 353352 by
filing and serving a motion expressly limiting the scope of appeal to a sin-
gle aspect of the judgment. When the appellee attempted to appeal from
another portion of the judgment, the court held that she could not do so
342. 610 S.W.2d at 735.
343. Id.
344. No. M 11843 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso May 20, 1981) (unreported).
345. TEX R. Civ. P. 356(b) provides:
An extension of time may be granted by the appellate court for late filing of a
cost bond or making the deposit required by subdivision (a) or for filing the
affidavit, if such bond is filed, deposit is made, or affidavit is filed within
fifteen days after the last day allowed and, within the same period, a motion is
filed in the appellate court reasonably explaining the need for such extension.
If a contest to an affidavit in lieu of bond is sustained, the time for filing the
bond is extended until ten days after the contest is sustained unless the trial
court finds and recites that the affidavit was not filed in good faith.
346. No. Ml 1843 at 1; see Figari, supra note 114, at 395-96.
347. No. M11843 at 1.
348. 618 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, wrif ref'd n.r.e.).
349. Id. at 569; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 353 which provides:
No attempt to limit the scope of an appeal shall be effective as to a party
adverse to the appellant unless the severable portion of the judgment from
which the appeal is taken is designated in a notice served on the adverse party
within fifteen days after the judgment is signed, or, if a motion for new trial is
filed by any party, within seventy-five days after the judgment is signed.
See generally Figari, supra note 114, at 397 n.458.
350. 618 S.W.2d at 569.
351. 614 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
352. TEX. R. Civ. P. 353.
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without perfecting an independent appeal by filing a cost bond and rec-
ord.353 Basic to this holding was the court's determination that the two
portions of the judgment were conceptually severable. 354
In contrast, the appellants in Gilbert v. Singleton35 5 complied with all
appropriate steps to obtain a statement of facts, but were unable to do so.
The official court reporter had resigned, and failed to comply with a writ
of mandamus to deliver the statement. Although the notes were then given
to a second reporter, the statement was demonstrably incomplete and of
doubtful accuracy. Granting the appellant's prayer for new trial, the court
held that an appellant who observes the proper procedure was entitled not
only to a statement of facts, but a complete statement.356 Thus, a new trial
was necessary to preserve that right.
XIV. RES JUDICATA
As noted in a prior Survey,357 a number of cases have held that mutual-
ity of parties is no longer required in Texas for application of the collateral
estoppel doctrine.358 Following these decisions, the court in Tobbon v.
State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co. held that an automobile ac-
cident victim was collaterally estopped from attacking the validity of a re-
lease in an action against the driver because the same issue had been raised
and decided adversely to her in a previous action involving her insurance
company.359 The court observed that "Texas Courts have apparently
abandoned the requirement of mutuality and have retained the require-
ment of privity only to the party against whom the plea of collateral estop-
pel is made in the second case."' 360 A contrary result, however, appears to
have been reached in McPherson v. Stovall when the court refused to apply
the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the former suit was not between
the same parties who were involved in the pending action.36'
Dolenz v. Continental National Bank,362 a recent decision of the supreme
court, concerned an unusual set of procedural events. The plaintiff, a
guarantor of a motel's indebtedness, brought a conversion action against a
creditor-bank that had sold certain personalty of the motel to satisfy a defi-
ciency resulting from a foreclosure sale. In an earlier action, the plaintiff-
guarantor had also sued the lessee of the motel for conversion of the same
property. The jury in the earlier action had found that the guarantor had
353. 614 S.W.2d at 588.
354. Id.
355. 611 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, no writ).
356. Id. at 165.
357. See Figari, supra note 83, at 480.
358. See, e.g., Olivarez v. Broadway Hardware, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 195, 200-02 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ refd n.r.e.); Baker v. Story, 564 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ); Hardy v. Fleming, 553 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
359. 616 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
360. 1d.
361. 603 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ).
362. 620 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1981).
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not purchased any of the personalty of his own personal account, and that
he had authorized the motel's personalty to be pledged to the creditor-
bank. No judgment in that earlier action, however, was entered at the time
of the trial of the action against the creditor-bank. The creditor-bank filed
a plea of abatement seeking to have the later action against it abated in
view of the jury verdict rendered in the earlier action against the lessee; the
plea was subsequently denied, and a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff-
guarantor was rendered. On appeal the supreme court held that the trial
court had not abused its discretion in refusing to abate the later action
because judgment had not been entered in the earlier one, although over a
year had transpired from the date of the verdict, and a judgment in the
earlier action would not have foreclosed all issues between the creditor-
bank and the guarantor in the later suit.363
XV. MISCELLANEOUS
Attorney's Fees. A number of decisions during the survey period ad-
dressed issues related to the recovery of attorney's fees under article
2226.36 In Findlay v. Cave365 the defendant contended that the plaintiff
was not entitled to a recovery of attorney's fees under the statute because
an excessive demand for the amounts due had been made. The court
noted that "[a] creditor who makes an excessive demand upon a debtor is
not entitled to attorney's fees for subsequent litigation required to recover
the debt."' 366 The supreme court distinguished the situation before it on
the grounds that the plaintiff had not brought suit for more than the liqui-
dated sum due, and the defendant had not tendered any sum that was
refused by the plaintiff.367 Accordingly, the court held that the record did
not reflect a sufficient level of unreasonableness or bad faith to warrant a
finding of excessive demand. 368 In Tuthill v. Southwestern Public Service
Co. the court of civil appeals emphasized that "a demand is not excessive
unless (1) the creditor wrongfully demands an amount in excess of that
which he is due; and (2) the creditor either refuses, or clearly indicates that
he will refuse, tender of the amount actually due."' 369 Holding that the
defendant had not obtained findings on these elements, the court overruled
the claim of excessive demand as barring recovery of attorney's fees.370
Finally, Westdale Well Service, Inc. v. Walker,371 a decision as yet unpub-
lished, holds that a plaintiff may recover attorney's fees even though the
defendant recovers a greater amount on a counterclaim. The court rea-
soned that a 1979 amendment to article 2226 authorized recovery of attor-
363. Id. at 575.
364. TEx.'REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
365. 611 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. 1981).
366. Id. at 58; accord Collingsworth v. King, 155 Tex. 93, 283 S.W.2d 30 (1955); Ingham
v. Harrison, 148 Tex. 380, 224 S.W.2d 1019 (1949).
367. 611 S.W.2d at 58.
368. Id.
369. 614 S.W.2d 205, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
370. Id
371. No. 20355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, Oct. 10, 1980) (unreported).
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ney's fees for a "just claim" and, as a result, prior cases recognizing a "net-
recovery" approach 372 were not longer authoritative. A "just claim," ac-
cording to the court, did not become "unjust" merely because a counter-
claim was filed.373
Attorney Disqualfication. At least three opinions were rendered during the
survey period on the disqualification of an attorney because the attorney
had previously represented the party moving for disqualification. All of
these cases recognized the general rule that a prior representation is not
grounds for disqualification unless a substantial relationship exists be-
tween the subject matter of the prior representation and the pending
suit.3 74 In each instance, the courts found that the substantial relationship
test was not satisfied and declined to order a disqualification. 375
SpecialAppearance. The special appearance of a third-party defendant to
a claim for indemnity by the trial court was sustained in Cessna Aircraft
Co. v. Hotton Aviation Co. 376 The third-party claimant appealed the rul-
ing. The court, relying upon an earlier case,377 held that the order was not
appealable because the ruling did not dispose of all parties and claims,
and, therefore, dismissed the appeal.378
Stipulation. Finally, in Kinner Transportation & Enterprises, Inc. v. State
the court considered the use in a summary judgment proceeding of a stipu-
lation that recited that it was to "be considered by the Court upon a trial
on the merits of this case.' ' 379 Recognizing that a stipulation may be lim-
ited to a part of a proceeding and concluding that a summary judgment
hearing was not a "trial on the merits,"380 the court held that the stipula-
372. Id. at 4. See, e.g., L.Q. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Boysen, 503 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Latham v. Dement, 409 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, writ refd n.r.e.); Johnny Morrow's Wrecking Crew v. Slate, 368
S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963, writ ref d n.r.e.); Paddock Eng'r Co. v. Rife,
310 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, writ ref d n.r.e.).
373. No. 20355 at 4.
374. Lott v. Ayres, 611 S.W.2d 473, 474-75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref d
n.r.e.); Braun v. Valley Ear, Nose & Throat Specialists, 611 S.W.2d 470, 471-72 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ); Lott v. Lott, 605 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1980, writ dism'd).
375. In Ayres the prior representation was in an action by a wife and husband for per-
sonal injuries against a corporation, while the later representation of the wife was in a di-
vorce against against the husband, who moved for disqualification. 611 S.W.2d at 474.
Braun involved a previous representation of the movant-husband in a matter related to a
divorce decree and a subsequent representation of his employer in a suit against him for
breach of an employment contract. 611 S.W.2d at 471-72. Finally, the situation presented
in Lott was the representation of a wife in a divorce action against the movant-husband after
a prior representation of the wife and husband in a personal injury action against a third
party. 605 S.W.2d at 668.
376. 620 S.W.2d 23i, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
377. Sullivan v. Tab Sales Co., 576 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, no
writ).
378. 620 S.W.2d at 233.
379. 614 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1981, no writ).
380. Id But see Claude Regis Vargo Enterprises, Inc. v. Bacarisse, 578 S.W.2d 524, 529
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tion would not support a summary judgment.38'
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); Mainland Sav. Ass'n v. Wil-
son, 545 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ); Bruce v. McA-
doo, 531 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ); Jones v. Houston
Materials Co., 477 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ), all
holding that a hearing on a motion for summary judgment is a "trial" within the meaning of
TEX. R. Civ. P. 63, which permits a party to amend his pleadings as a matter of right until
"within seven days of the date of trial."
381. 614 S.W.2d at 189-90.
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